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We propose a new DRAM-based true random number gener-
ator (TRNG) that leverages DRAM cells as an entropy source.
The key idea is to intentionally violate the DRAM access timing
parameters and use the resulting errors as the source of random-
ness. Our technique specically decreases the DRAM row acti-
vation latency (timing parameter tRCD) below manufacturer-
recommended specications, to induce read errors, or activation
failures, that exhibit true random behavior. We then aggregate
the resulting data from multiple cells to obtain a TRNG capa-
ble of providing a high throughput of random numbers at low
latency.
To demonstrate that our TRNG design is viable using com-
modity DRAM chips, we rigorously characterize the behavior
of activation failures in 282 state-of-the-art LPDDR4 devices
from three major DRAM manufacturers. We verify our ob-
servations using four additional DDR3 DRAM devices from
the same manufacturers. Our results show that many cells in
each device produce random data that remains robust over both
time and temperature variation. We use our observations to
develop D-RaNGe, a methodology for extracting true random
numbers from commodity DRAM devices with high through-
put and low latency by deliberately violating the read access
timing parameters. We evaluate the quality of our TRNG using
the commonly-used NIST statistical test suite for randomness
and nd that D-RaNGe: 1) successfully passes each test, and 2)
generates true random numbers with over two orders of magni-
tude higher throughput than the previous highest-throughput
DRAM-based TRNG.
1. Introduction
Random number generators (RNGs) are critical compo-
nents in many dierent applications, including cryptography,
scientic simulation, industrial testing, and recreational en-
tertainment [13,15,31,37,47,69,80,82,95,121,135,142,152,162].
These applications require a mechanism capable of rapidly
generating random numbers across a wide variety of op-
erating conditions (e.g., temperature/voltage uctuations,
manufacturing variations, malicious external attacks) [158].
In particular, for modern cryptographic applications, a ran-
dom (i.e., completely unpredictable) number generator is
critical to prevent information leakage to a potential adver-
sary [31, 37, 47, 69, 79, 80, 82, 152, 162].
Random number generators can be broadly classied into
two categories [32, 78, 145, 148]: 1) pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) [18, 98, 100, 102, 133], which deterministi-
cally generate numbers starting from a seed value with the
goal of approximating a true random sequence, and 2) true
random number generators (TRNGs) [6, 16, 22, 23, 24, 33, 36, 47,
50,55,56,57,65,77,83,96,101,111,116,119,141,143,144,146,149,
151, 153, 155, 158], which generate random numbers based on
sampling non-deterministic random variables inherent in var-
ious physical phenomena (e.g., electrical noise, atmospheric
noise, clock jitter, Brownian motion).
PRNGs are popular due to their exibility, low cost, and fast
pseudo-random number generation time [24], but their out-
put is fully determined by the starting seed value. This means
that the output of a PRNG may be predictable given complete
information about its operation. Therefore, a PRNG falls short
for applications that require high-entropy values [31, 35, 152].
In contrast, because a TRNG mechanism relies on sampling
entropy inherent in non-deterministic physical phenomena,
the output of a TRNG is fully unpredictable even when com-
plete information about the underlying mechanism is avail-
able [79].
Based on analysis done by prior work on TRNG design [64,
79, 124], we argue that an eective TRNG must: 1) produce
truly random (i.e., completely unpredictable) numbers, 2)
provide a high throughput of random numbers at low latency,
and 3) be practically implementable at low cost. Many prior
works study dierent methods of generating true random
numbers that can be implemented using CMOS devices [6,16,
22, 23, 24, 33, 36, 47, 50, 55, 56, 57, 65, 77, 83, 96, 101, 111, 116, 119,
141,143,144,146,149,151,153,155,158]. We provide a thorough
discussion of these past works in Section 9. Unfortunately,
most of these proposals fail to satisfy all of the properties
of an eective TRNG because they either require specialized
hardware to implement (e.g., free-running oscillators [6, 158],
metastable circuitry [16, 22, 101, 146]) or are unable to sustain
continuous high-throughput operation on the order of Mb/s
(e.g., memory startup values [39, 55, 56, 144, 151], memory
data retention failures [65, 141]). These limitations preclude
the widespread adoption of such TRNGs, thereby limiting the
overall impact of these proposals.
Commodity DRAM chips oer a promising substrate to
overcome these limitations due to three major reasons. First,
DRAM operation is highly sensitive to changes in access
timing, which means that we can easily induce failures by
manipulating manufacturer-recommended DRAM access tim-
ing parameters. These failures have been shown to exhibit
non-determinism [27, 66, 71, 72, 84, 87, 109, 112, 117, 157] and
therefore they may be exploitable for true random number
generation. Second, commodity DRAM devices already pro-
vide an interface capable of transferring data continuously
with high throughput in order to support a high-performance
TRNG. Third, DRAM devices are already prevalently in use
throughout modern computing systems, ranging from simple
microcontrollers to sophisticated supercomputers.
Our goal in this paper is to design a TRNG that:
1. is implementable on commodity DRAM devices today
2. is fully non-deterministic (i.e., it is impossible to predict
the next output even with complete information about the
underlying mechanism)
3. provides continuous (i.e., constant rate), high-throughput
random values at low latency
4. provides random values while minimally aecting
concurrently-running applications
Meeting these four goals would enable a TRNG design that
is suitable for applications requiring high-throughput true
random number generation in commodity devices today.
Prior approaches to DRAM-based TRNG design success-
fully use DRAM data retention failures [50, 65, 141], DRAM
startup values [39,144], and non-determinism in DRAM com-
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mand scheduling [116] to generate true random numbers.
Unfortunately, these approaches do not fully satisfy our four
goals because they either do not exploit a fundamentally non-
deterministic entropy source (e.g., DRAM command schedul-
ing [116]) or are too slow for continuous high-throughput
operation (e.g., DRAM data retention failures [50, 65, 141],
DRAM startup values [39, 144]). Section 8 provides a detailed
comparative analysis of these prior works.
In this paper, we propose a new way to leverage DRAM
cells as an entropy source for true random number generation
by intentionally violating the access timing parameters and
using the resulting errors as the source of randomness. Our
technique specically extracts randomness from activation
failures, i.e., DRAM errors caused by intentionally decreasing
the row activation latency (timing parameter tRCD) below
manufacturer-recommended specications. Our proposal is
based on two key observations:
1. Reading certain DRAM cells with a reduced activation
latency returns true random values.
2. An activation failure can be induced very quickly (i.e., even
faster than a normal DRAM row activation).
Based on these key observations, we propose D-RaNGe,
a new methodology for extracting true random numbers
from commodity DRAM devices with high throughput. D-
RaNGe consists of two steps: 1) identifying specic DRAM
cells that are vulnerable to activation failures using a low-
latency proling step and 2) generating a continuous stream
(i.e., constant rate) of random numbers by repeatedly induc-
ing activation failures in the previously-identied vulnerable
cells. D-RaNGe runs entirely in software and is capable of
immediately running on any commodity system that provides
the ability to manipulate DRAM timing parameters within
the memory controller [7, 8]. For most other devices, a sim-
ple software API must be exposed without any hardware
changes to the commodity DRAM device (e.g., similarly to
SoftMC [52, 132]), which makes D-RaNGe suitable for imple-
mentation on most existing systems today.
In order to demonstrate D-RaNGe’s eectiveness, we per-
form a rigorous experimental characterization of activation
failures using 282 state-of-the-art LPDDR4 [63] DRAM de-
vices from three major DRAM manufacturers. We also verify
our observations using four additional DDR3 [62] DRAM
devices from a single manufacturer. Using the standard NIST
statistical test suite for randomness [122], we show that D-
RaNGe is able to maintain high-quality true random number
generation both over 15 days of testing and across the en-
tire reliable testing temperature range of our infrastructure
(55◦C-70◦C). Our results show that D-RaNGe’s maximum
(average) throughput is 717.4Mb/s (435.7Mb/s) using four
LPDDR4 DRAM channels, which is over two orders of mag-
nitude higher than that of the best prior DRAM-based TRNG.
We make the following key contributions:
1. We introduce D-RaNGe, a new methodology for extracting
true random numbers from a commodity DRAM device
at high throughput and low latency. The key idea of D-
RaNGe is to use DRAM cells as entropy sources to generate
true random numbers by accessing them with a latency
that is lower than manufacturer-recommended specica-
tions.
2. Using experimental data from 282 state-of-the-art LPDDR4
DRAM devices from three major DRAM manufacturers,
we present a rigorous characterization of randomness in
errors induced by accessing DRAM with low latency. Our
analysis demonstrates that D-RaNGe is able to maintain
high-quality random number generation both over 15 days
of testing and across the entire reliable testing temperature
range of our infrastructure (55◦C-70◦C). We verify our ob-
servations from this study with prior works’ observations
on DDR3 DRAM devices [27, 71, 84, 87]. Furthermore, we
experimentally demonstrate on four DDR3 DRAM devices,
from a single manufacturer, that D-RaNGe is suitable for
implementation in a wide range of commodity DRAM
devices.
3. We evaluate the quality of D-RaNGe’s output bitstream
using the standard NIST statistical test suite for random-
ness [122] and nd that it successfully passes every test.
We also compare D-RaNGe’s performance to four previ-
ously proposed DRAM-based TRNG designs (Section 8)
and show that D-RaNGe outperforms the best prior DRAM-
based TRNG design by over two orders of magnitude in
terms of maximum and average throughput.
2. Background
We provide the necessary background on DRAM and true
random number generation that is required to understand our
idea of true random number generation using the inherent
properties of DRAM.
2.1. Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
We briey describe DRAM organization and basics. We
refer the reader to past works [17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 46, 51, 52,
66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 105, 112, 117,
125, 127, 128, 161, 161] for more detail.
2.1.1. DRAM System Organization. In a typical system
conguration, a CPU chip includes a set of memory con-
trollers, where each memory controller interfaces with a
DRAM channel to perform read and write operations. As
we show in Figure 1 (left), a DRAM channel has its own I/O
bus and operates independently of other channels in the sys-
tem. To achieve high memory capacity, a channel can host
multiple DRAM modules by sharing the I/O bus between the
modules. A DRAM module implements a single or multiple
DRAM ranks. Command and data transfers are serialized
between ranks in the same channel due to the shared I/O bus.
A DRAM rank consists of multiple DRAM chips that operate
in lock-step, i.e., all chips simultaneously perform the same
operation, but they do so on dierent bits. The number of
DRAM chips per rank depends on the data bus width of the
DRAM chips and the channel width. For example, a typical
system has a 64-bit wide DRAM channel. Thus, four 16-bit or
eight 8-bit DRAM chips are needed to build a DRAM rank.
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Figure 1: A typical DRAM-based system [71].
2.1.2. DRAMChip Organization. At a high-level, a DRAM
chip consists of billions of DRAM cells that are hierarchically
organized to maximize storage density and performance. We
describe each level of the hierarchy of a modern DRAM chip.
A modern DRAM chip is composed of multiple DRAM
banks (shown in Figure 1, right). The chip communicates
with the memory controller through the I/O circuitry. The
I/O circuitry is connected to the internal command and data
bus that is shared among all banks in the chip.
Figure 2a illustrates the organization of a DRAM bank. In
a bank, the global row decoder partially decodes the address
of the accessed DRAM row to select the corresponding DRAM
subarray. A DRAM subarray is a 2D array of DRAM cells,
where cells are horizontally organized into multiple DRAM
2
rows. A DRAM row is a set of DRAM cells that share a
wire called the wordline, which the local row decoder of the
subarray drives after fully decoding the row address. In a
subarray, a column of cells shares a wire, referred to as the
bitline, that connects the column of cells to a sense amplier.
The sense amplier is the circuitry used to read and modify
the data of a DRAM cell. The row of sense ampliers in
the subarray is referred to as the local row-buer. To access
a DRAM cell, the corresponding DRAM row rst needs to
be copied into the local row-buer, which connects to the
internal I/O bus via the global row-buer.
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Figure 2: DRAM bank and cell architecture [71].
Figure 2b illustrates a DRAM cell, which is composed of a
storage capacitor and access transistor. A DRAM cell stores
a single bit of information based on the charge level of the
capacitor. The data stored in the cell is interpreted as a “1” or
“0” depending on whether the charge stored in the cell is above
or below a certain threshold. Unfortunately, the capacitor
and the access transistor are not ideal circuit components
and have charge leakage paths. Thus, to ensure that the cell
does not leak charge to the point where the bit stored in the
cell ips, the cell needs to be periodically refreshed to fully
restore its original charge.
2.1.3. DRAM Commands. The memory controller issues a
set of DRAM commands to access data in the DRAM chip.
To perform a read or write operation, the memory controller
rst needs to open a row, i.e., copy the data of the cells in the
row to the row-buer. To open a row, the memory controller
issues an activate (ACT) command to a bank by specifying the
address of the row to open. The memory controller can issue
ACT commands to dierent banks in consecutive DRAM
bus cycles to operate on multiple banks in parallel. After
opening a row in a bank, the memory controller issues either
a READ or a WRITE command to read or write a DRAM word
(which is typically equal to 64 bytes) within the open row.
An open row can serve multiple READ and WRITE requests
without incurring precharge and activation delays. A DRAM
row typically contains 4-8 KiBs of data. To access data from
another DRAM row in the same bank, the memory controller
must rst close the currently open row by issuing a precharge
(PRE) command. The memory controller also periodically
issues refresh (REF) commands to prevent data loss due to
charge leakage.
2.1.4. DRAM Cell Operation. We describe DRAM opera-
tion by explaining the steps involved in reading data from a
DRAM cell.1 The memory controller initiates each step by
issuing a DRAM command. Each step takes a certain amount
of time to complete, and thus, a DRAM command is typically
associated with one or more timing constraints known as
timing parameters. It is the responsibility of the memory con-
troller to satisfy these timing parameters in order to ensure
correct DRAM operation.
1Although we focus only on reading data, steps involved in a write
operation are similar.
In Figure 3, we show how the state of a DRAM cell changes
during the steps involved in a read operation. Each DRAM
cell diagram corresponds to the state of the cell at exactly
the tick mark on the time axis. Each command (shown in
purple boxes below the time axis) is issued by the memory
controller at the corresponding tick mark. Initially, the cell is
in a precharged state 1 . When precharged, the capacitor of
the cell is disconnected from the bitline since the wordline is
not asserted and thus the access transistor is o. The bitline
voltage is stable at Vdd2 and is ready to be perturbed towards
the voltage level of the cell capacitor upon enabling the access
transistor.
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Figure 3: Command sequence for reading data from DRAM
and the state of a DRAM cell during each related step.
To read data from a cell, the memory controller rst needs
to perform row activation by issuing an ACT command. Dur-
ing row activation ( 2 ), the row decoder asserts the wordline
that connects the storage capacitor of the cell to the bitline
by enabling the access transistor. At this point, the capacitor
charge perturbs the bitline via the charge sharing process.
Charge sharing continues until the capacitor and bitline volt-
ages reach an equal value of Vdd2 + δ. After charge sharing
( 3 ), the sense amplier begins driving the bitline towards
either Vdd or 0V depending on the direction of the perturba-
tion in the charge sharing step. This step, which amplies
the voltage level on the bitline as well as the cell is called
charge restoration. Although charge restoration continues
until the original capacitor charge is fully replenished ( 4 ),
the memory controller can issue a READ command to safely
read data from the activated row before the capacitor charge
is fully replenished. A READ command can reliably be issued
when the bitline voltage reaches the voltage level Vread . To
ensure that the read occurs after the bitline reaches Vread ,
the memory controller inserts a time interval tRCD between
the ACT and READ commands. It is the responsibility of
the DRAM manufacturer to ensure that their DRAM chip
operates safely as long as the memory controller obeys the
tRCD timing parameter, which is dened in the DRAM stan-
dard [63]. If the memory controller issues a READ command
before tRCD elapses, the bitline voltage may be below Vread ,
which can lead to the reading of a wrong value.
To return a cell to its precharged state, the voltage in the
cell must rst be fully restored. A cell is expected to be
fully restored when the memory controller satises a time
interval dictated by tRAS after issuing the ACT command.
Failing to satisfy tRAS may lead to insucient amount of
charge to be restored in the cells of the accessed row. A
subsequent activation of the row can then result in the reading
of incorrect data from the cells.
Once the cell is successfully restored ( 4 ), the memory con-
troller can issue a PRE command to close the currently-open
row to prepare the bank for an access to another row. The
cell returns to the precharged state ( 5 ) after waiting for the
timing parameter tRP following the PRE command. Violat-
ing tRP may prevent the sense ampliers from fully driving
the bitline back to Vdd2 , which may later result in the row
3
to be activated with too small amount of charge in its cells,
potentially preventing the sense ampliers to read the data
correctly.
For correct DRAM operation, it is critical for the memory
controller to ensure that the DRAM timing parameters de-
ned in the DRAM specication are not violated. Violation
of the timing parameters may lead to incorrect data to be
read from the DRAM, and thus cause unexpected program
behavior [26, 27, 30, 52, 67, 84, 87]. In this work, we study the
failure modes due to violating DRAM timing parameters and
explore their application to reliably generating true random
numbers.
2.2. True Random Number Generators
A true random number generator (TRNG) requires physi-
cal processes (e.g., radioactive decay, thermal noise, Poisson
noise) to construct a bitstream of random data. Unlike pseudo-
random number generators, the random numbers generated
by a TRNG do not depend on the previously-generated num-
bers and only depend on the random noise obtained from
physical processes. TRNGs are usually validated using sta-
tistical tests such as NIST [122] or DIEHARD [97]. A TRNG
typically consists of 1) an entropy source, 2) a randomness
extraction technique, and sometimes 3) a post-processor, which
improves the randomness of the extracted data often at the
expense of throughput. These three components are typically
used to reliably generate true random numbers [135, 139].
Entropy Source. The entropy source is a critical com-
ponent of a random number generator, as its amount of en-
tropy aects the unpredictability and the throughput of the
generated random data. Various physical phenomena can
be used as entropy sources. In the domain of electrical cir-
cuits, thermal and Poisson noise, jitter, and circuit metasta-
bility have been proposed as processes that have high en-
tropy [16, 22, 55, 56, 101, 119, 146, 151, 153]. To ensure robust-
ness, the entropy source should not be visible or modiable
by an adversary. Failing to satisfy that requirement would
result in generating predictable data, and thus put the system
into a state susceptible to security attacks.
Randomness Extraction Technique. The randomness
extraction technique harvests random data from an entropy
source. A good randomness extraction technique should have
two key properties. First, it should have high throughput, i.e.,
extract as much as randomness possible in a short amount
of time [79, 135], especially important for applications that
require high-throughput random number generation (e.g.,
security applications [13,15,21,31,37,47,69,80,82,95,101,121,
135, 142, 152, 159, 162], scientic simulation [21, 95]). Second,
it should not disturb the physical process [79, 135]. Aecting
the entropy source during the randomness extraction process
would make the harvested data predictable, lowering the
reliability of the TRNG.
Post-processing. Harvesting randomness from a physi-
cal phenomenon may produce bits that are biased or corre-
lated [79, 118]. In such a case, a post-processing step, which
is also known as de-biasing, is applied to eliminate the bias
and correlation. The post-processing step also provides pro-
tection against environmental changes and adversary tam-
pering [79,118,135]. Well-known post-processing techniques
are the von Neumann corrector [64] and cryptographic hash
functions such as SHA-1 [38] or MD5 [120]. These post-
processing steps work well, but generally result in decreased
throughput (e.g., up to 80% [81]).
3. Motivation and Goal
True random numbers sampled from physical phenom-
ena have a number of real-world applications from system
security [13, 121, 135] to recreational entertainment [135].
As user data privacy becomes a highly-sought commodity in
Internet-of-Things (IoT) and mobile devices, enabling prim-
itives that provide security on such systems becomes criti-
cally important [90, 115, 162]. Cryptography is one typical
method for securing systems against various attacks by en-
crypting the system’s data with keys generated with true
random values. Many cryptographic algorithms require ran-
dom values to generate keys in many standard protocols
(e.g., TLS/SSL/RSA/VPN keys) to either 1) encrypt network
packets, le systems, and data, 2) select internet protocol
sequence numbers (TCP), or 3) generate data padding val-
ues [31, 37, 47, 69, 80, 82, 152, 162]. TRNGs are also commonly
used in authentication protocols and in countermeasures
against hardware attacks [31], in which psuedo-random num-
ber generators (PRNGs) are shown to be insecure [31, 152].
To keep up with the ever-increasing rate of secure data cre-
ation, especially with the growing number of commodity
data-harvesting devices (e.g., IoT and mobile devices), the
ability to generate true random numbers with high through-
put and low latency becomes ever more relevant to maintain
user data privacy. In addition, high-throughput TRNGs are
already essential components of various important applica-
tions such as scientic simulation [21, 95], industrial testing,
statistical sampling, randomized algorithms, and recreational
entertainment [13, 15, 21, 95, 101, 121, 135, 142, 159, 162].
A widely-available, high-throughput, low-latency TRNG
will enable all previously mentioned applications that rely
on TRNGs, including improved security and privacy in most
systems that are known to be vulnerable to attacks [90, 115,
162], as well as enable research that we may not anticipate
at the moment. One such direction is using a one-time pad
(i.e., a private key used to encode and decode only a single
message) with quantum key distribution, which requires at
least 4Gb/s of true random number generation throughput [34,
94, 154]. Many high-throughput TRNGs have been recently
proposed [12, 15, 31, 42, 48, 80, 82, 101, 110, 147, 154, 159, 162,
163], and the availability of these high-throughput TRNGs
can enable a wide range of new applications with improved
security and privacy.
DRAM oers a promising substrate for developing an ef-
fective and widely-available TRNG due to the prevalence of
DRAM throughout all modern computing systems ranging
from microcontrollers to supercomputers. A high-throughput
DRAM-based TRNG would help enable widespread adop-
tion of applications that are today limited to only select
architectures equipped with dedicated high-performance
TRNG engines. Examples of such applications include high-
performance scientic simulations and cryptographic applica-
tions for securing devices and communication protocols, both
of which would run much more eciently on mobile devices,
embedded devices, or microcontrollers with the availability
of higher-throughput TRNGs in the system.
In terms of the CPU architecture itself, a high-throughput
DRAM-based TRNG could help the memory controller to im-
prove scheduling decisions [10, 74, 107, 108, 136, 137, 138, 150]
and enable the implementation a truly-randomized version of
PARA [73] (i.e., a protection mechanism against the RowHam-
mer vulnerability [73, 106]). Furthermore, a DRAM-based
TRNG would likely have additional hardware and software
applications as system designs become more capable and
increasingly security-critical.
In addition to traditional computing paradigms, DRAM-
based TRNGs can benet processing-in-memory (PIM) archi-
tectures [45, 130], which co-locate logic within or near mem-
ory to overcome the large bandwidth and energy bottleneck
caused by the memory bus and leverage the signicant data
parallelism available within the DRAM chip itself. Many prior
works provide primitives for PIM or exploit PIM-enabled sys-
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tems for workload acceleration [4, 5, 11, 19, 20, 29, 41, 43, 44, 45,
53,58,59,70,86,93,103,113,125,126,127,128,129,130,140,160].
A low-latency, high-throughput DRAM-based TRNG can en-
able PIM applications to source random values directly within
the memory itself, thereby enhancing the overall potential,
security, and privacy, of PIM-enabled architectures. For ex-
ample, in applications that require true random numbers, a
DRAM-based TRNG can enable large contiguous code seg-
ments to execute in memory, which would reduce commu-
nication with the CPU, and thus improve system eciency.
A DRAM-based TRNG can also enable security tasks to run
completely in memory. This would remove the dependence
of PIM-based security tasks on an I/O channel and would
increase overall system security.
We posit, based on analysis done in prior works [64,79,124],
that an eective TRNG must satisfy six key properties: it must
1) have low implementation cost, 2) be fully non-deterministic
such that it is impossible to predict the next output given
complete information about how the mechanism operates, 3)
provide a continuous stream of true random numbers with
high throughput, 4) provide true random numbers with low
latency, 5) exhibit low system interference, i.e., not signi-
cantly slow down concurrently-running applications, and 6)
generate random values with low energy overhead.
To this end, our goal in this work, is to provide a widely-
available TRNG for DRAM devices that satises all six key
properties of an eective TRNG.
4. Testing Environment
In order to test our hypothesis that DRAM cells are an ef-
fective source of entropy when accessed with reduced DRAM
timing parameters, we developed an infrastructure to char-
acterize modern LPDDR4 DRAM chips. We also use an in-
frastructure for DDR3 DRAM chips, SoftMC [52, 132], to
demonstrate empirically that our proposal is applicable be-
yond the LPDDR4 technology. Both testing environments
give us precise control over DRAM commands and DRAM
timing parameters as veried with a logic analyzer probing
the command bus.
We perform all tests, unless otherwise specied, using a
total of 282 2y-nm LPDDR4 DRAM chips from three major
manufacturers in a thermally-controlled chamber held at
45◦C. For consistency across results, we precisely stabilize
the ambient temperature using heaters and fans controlled
via a microcontroller-based proportional-integral-derivative
(PID) loop to within an accuracy of 0.25◦C and a reliable
range of 40◦C to 55◦C. We maintain DRAM temperature
at 15◦C above ambient temperature using a separate local
heating source. We use temperature sensors to smooth out
temperature variations caused by self-induced heating.
We also use a separate infrastructure, based on open-source
SoftMC [52, 132], to validate our mechanism on 4 DDR3
DRAM chips from a single manufacturer. SoftMC enables
precise control over timing parameters, and we house the
DRAM chips inside another temperature chamber to maintain
a stable ambient testing temperature (with the same tempera-
ture range as the temperature chamber used for the LPDDR4
devices).
To explore the various eects of temperature, short-term
aging, and circuit-level interference (in Section 5) on activa-
tion failures, we reduce the tRCD parameter from the default
18ns to 10ns for all experiments, unless otherwise stated. Al-
gorithm 1 explains the general testing methodology we use
to induce activation failures. First, we write a data pattern to
the region of DRAM under test (Line 2). Next, we reduce the
tRCD parameter to begin inducing activation failures (Line 3).
We then access the DRAM region in column order (Lines 4-
5) in order to ensure that each DRAM access is to a closed
Algorithm 1: DRAM Activation Failure Testing
1 DRAM_ACT_failure_testing(data_pattern, DRAM_region):
2 write data_pattern (e.g., solid 1s) into all cells in DRAM_region
3 set low tRCD for ranks containing DRAM_region
4 foreach col in DRAM_region:
5 foreach row in DRAM_region:
6 activate(row) // fully refresh cells
7 precharge(row) // ensure next access activates the row
8 activate(row)
9 read(col) // induce activation failure on col
10 precharge(row)
11 record activation failures to storage
12 set default tRCD for DRAM ranks containing DRAM_region
DRAM row and thus requires an activation. This enables each
access to induce activation failures in DRAM. Prior to each
reduced-latency read, we rst refresh the target row such
that each cell has the same amount of charge each time it is
accessed with a reduced-latency read. We eectively refresh
a row by issuing an activate (Line 6) followed by a precharge
(Line 7) to that row. We then induce the activation failures
by issuing consecutive activate (Line 8), read (Line 9), and
precharge (Line 10) commands. Afterwards, we record any
activation failures that we observe (Line 11). We nd that this
methodology enables us to quickly induce activation failures
across all of DRAM, and minimizes testing time.
5. Activation Failure Characterization
To demonstrate the viability of using DRAM cells as an
entropy source for random data, we explore and characterize
DRAM failures when employing a reduced DRAM activation
latency (tRCD) across 282 LPDDR4 DRAM chips. We also
compare our ndings against those of prior works that study
an older generation of DDR3 DRAM chips [27, 71, 84, 87] to
cross-validate our infrastructure. To understand the eects
of changing environmental conditions on a DRAM cell that is
used as a source of entropy, we rigorously characterize DRAM
cell behavior as we vary four environmental conditions. First,
we study the eects of DRAM array design-induced variation
(i.e., the spatial distribution of activation failures in DRAM).
Second, we study data pattern dependence (DPD) eects on
DRAM cells. Third, we study the eects of temperature vari-
ation on DRAM cells. Fourth, we study a DRAM cell’s acti-
vation failure probability over time. We present several key
observations that support the viability of a mechanism that
generates random numbers by accessing DRAM cells with
a reduced tRCD . In Section 6, we discuss a mechanism to
eectively sample DRAM cells to extract true random num-
bers while minimizing the eects of environmental condition
variation (presented in this section) on the DRAM cells.
5.1. Spatial Distribution of Activation Failures
To study which regions of DRAM are better suited to gen-
erating random data, we rst visually inspect the spatial dis-
tributions of activation failures both across DRAM chips and
within each chip individually. Figure 4 plots the spatial dis-
tribution of activation failures in a representative 1024× 1024
array of DRAM cells taken from a single DRAM chip. Every
observed activation failure is marked in black. We make two
observations. First, we observe that each contiguous region
of 512 DRAM rows2 consists of repeating rows with the same
set (or subset) of column bits that are prone to activation
failures. As shown in the gure, rows 0 to 511 have the same
8 (or a subset of the 8) column bits failing in the row, and
rows 512 to 1023 have the same 4 (or a subset of the 4) column
2We note that subarrays have either 512 or 1024 (not shown) rows
depending on the manufacturer of the DRAM device.
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bits failing in the row. We hypothesize that these contiguous
regions reveal the DRAM subarray architecture as a result
of variation across the local sense ampliers in the subarray.
We indicate the two subarrays in Figure 4 as Subarray A and
Subarray B. A “weaker” local sense amplier results in cells
that share its respective local bitline in the subarray having an
increased probability of failure. For this reason, we observe
that activation failures are localized to a few columns within
a DRAM subarray as shown in Figure 4. Second, we observe
that within a subarray, the activation failure probability in-
creases across rows (i.e., activation failures are more likely to
occur in higher-numbered rows in the subarray and are less
likely in lower-numbered rows in the subarray). This can be
seen from the fact that more cells fail in higher-numbered
rows in the subarray (i.e., there are more black marks higher
in each subarray). We hypothesize that the failure probability
of a cell attached to a local bitline correlates with the distance
between the row and the local sense ampliers, and further
rows have less time to amplify their data due to the signal
propagation delay in a bitline. These observations are similar
to those made in prior studies [27,71,84,87] on DDR3 devices.
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Figure 4: Activation failure bitmap in 1024× 1024 cell array.
We next study the granularity at which we can induce
activation failures when accessing a row. We observe (not
shown) that activation failures occur only within the rst
cache line that is accessed immediately following an activa-
tion. No subsequent access to an already open row results in
activation failures. This is because cells within the same row
have a longer time to restore their cell charge (Figure 3) when
they are accessed after the row has already been opened. We
draw two key conclusions: 1) the region and bitline of DRAM
being accessed aect the number of observable activation
failures, and 2) dierent DRAM subarrays and dierent local
bitlines exhibit varying levels of entropy.
5.2. Data Pattern Dependence
To understand the data pattern dependence of activation
failures and DRAM cell entropy, we study how eectively
we can discover failures using dierent data patterns across
multiple rounds of testing. Our goal in this experiment is
to determine which data pattern results in the highest en-
tropy such that we can generate random values with high
throughput. Similar to prior works [91, 112] that extensively
describe the data patterns, we analyze a total of 40 unique
data patterns: solid 1s, checkered, row stripe, column stripe,
16 walking 1s, and the inverses of all 20 aforementioned data
patterns.
Figure 5 plots the ratio of activation failures discovered by a
particular data pattern after 100 iterations of Algorithm 1 rel-
ative to the total number of failures discovered by all patterns
for a representative chip from each manufacturer. We call
this metric coverage because it indicates the eectiveness of
a single data pattern to identify all possible DRAM cells that
are prone to activation failure. We show results for each pat-
tern individually except for the WALK1 and WALK0 patterns,
for which we show the mean (bar) and minimum/maximum
(error bars) coverage across all 16 iterations of each walking
pattern.
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Figure 5: Data pattern dependence of DRAM cells prone to
activation failure over 100 iterations
We make three key observations from this experiment.
First, we nd that testing with dierent data patterns iden-
ties dierent subsets of the total set of possible activation
failures. This indicates that 1) dierent data patterns cause
dierent DRAM cells to fail and 2) specic data patterns in-
duce more activation failures than others. Thus, certain data
patterns may extract more entropy from a DRAM cell ar-
ray than other data patterns. Second, we nd that, of all 40
tested data patterns, each of the 16 walking 1s, for a given
device, provides a similarly high coverage, regardless of the
manufacturer. This high coverage is similarly provided by
only one other data pattern per manufacturer: solid 0s for
manufacturers A and B, and walking 0s for manufacturer
C. Third, if we repeat this experiment (i.e., Figure 5) while
varying the number of iterations of Algorithm 1, the total
failure count across all data patterns increases as we increase
the number of iterations of Algorithm 1. This indicates that
not all DRAM cells fail deterministically when accessed with
a reduced tRCD , providing a potential source of entropy for
random number generation.
We next analyze each cell’s probability of failing when
accessed with a reduced tRCD (i.e., its activation failure pro-
bability) to determine which data pattern most eectively
identies cells that provide high entropy. We note that DRAM
cells with an activation failure probability Fprob of 50% pro-
vide high entropy when accessed many times. With the same
data used to produce Figure 5, we study the dierent data
patterns with regard to the number of cells they cause to fail
50% of the time. Interestingly, we nd that the data pattern
that induces the most failures overall does not necessarily
nd the most number of cells that fail 50% of the time. In
fact, when searching for cells with an Fprob between 40% and
60%, we observe that the data patterns that nd the highest
number of cells are solid 0s, checkered 0s, and solid 0s for
manufacturers A, B, and C, respectively. We conclude that:
1) due to manufacturing and design variation across DRAM
devices from dierent manufacturers, dierent data patterns
result in dierent failure probabilities in our DRAM devices,
and 2) to provide high entropy when accessing DRAM cells
with a reduced tRCD , we should use the respective data pat-
tern that nds the most number of cells with an Fprob of 50%
for DRAM devices from a given manufacturer.
Unless otherwise stated, in the rest of this paper, we use
the solid 0s, checkered 0s, and solid 0s data patterns for man-
ufacturers A, B, and C, respectively, to analyze Fprob at the
granularity of a single cell and to study the eects of temper-
ature and time on our sources of entropy.
5.3. Temperature Eects
In this section, we study whether temperature uctuations
aect a DRAM cell’s activation failure probability and thus the
entropy that can be extracted from the DRAM cell. To analyze
temperature eects, we record the Fprob of cells throughout
our DRAM devices across 100 iterations of Algorithm 1 at
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5◦C increments between 55◦C and 70◦). Figure 6 aggregates
results across 30 DRAM modules from each DRAM manufac-
turer. Each point in the gure represents how the Fprob of a
DRAM cell changes as the temperature changes (i.e., ∆Fprob).
The x-axis shows the Fprob of a single cell at temperature
T (i.e., the baseline temperature), and the y-axis shows the
Fprob of the same cell at temperature T + 5 (i.e., 5◦C above
the baseline temperature). Because we test each cell at each
temperature across 100 iterations, the granularity of Fprob on
both the x- and y-axes is 1%. For a given Fprob at temperature
T (x% on the x-axis), we aggregate all respective Fprob points
at temperature T +5 (y% on the y-axis) with box-and-whiskers
plots3 to show how the given Fprob is aected by the increased
DRAM temperature. The box is drawn in blue and contains
the median drawn in red. The whiskers are drawn in gray,
and the outliers are indicated with orange pluses.
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Figure 6: Eect of temperature variation on failure probabi-
lity
We observe that Fprob at temperature T + 5 tends to be
higher than Fprob at temperature T , as shown by the blue
region of the gure (i.e., the boxes of the box-and-whiskers
plots) lying above the x = y line. However, fewer than 25%
of all data points fall below the x = y line, indicating that a
portion of cells have a lower Fprob as temperature is increased.
We observe that DRAM devices from dierent manufac-
turers are aected by temperature dierently. DRAM cells of
manufacturer A have the least variation of∆Fprob when tem-
perature is increased since the boxes of the box-and-whiskers
plots are strongly correlated with the x = y line. How a
DRAM cell’s activation failure probability changes in DRAM
devices from other manufacturers is unfortunately less pre-
dictable under temperature change (i.e., a DRAM cell from
manufacturers B or C has higher variation in Fprob change),
but the data still shows a strong positive correlation between
temperature and Fprob. We conclude that temperature aects
cell failure probability (Fprob) to dierent degrees depending
on the manufacturer of the DRAM device, but increasing tem-
perature generally increases the activation failure probability.
5.4. Entropy Variation over Time
To determine whether the failure probability of a DRAM
cell changes over time, we complete 250 rounds of recording
the activation failure probability of DRAM cells over the span
of 15 days. Each round consists of accessing every cell in
DRAM 100 times with a reduced tRCD value and recording
the failure probability for each individual cell (out of 100
iterations). We nd that a DRAM cell’s activation failure pro-
3A box-and-whiskers plot emphasizes the important metrics of a
dataset’s distribution. The box is lower-bounded by the rst quartile (i.e., the
median of the rst half of the ordered set of data points) and upper-bounded
by the third quartile (i.e., the median of the second half of the ordered set of
data points). The median falls within the box. The inter-quartile range (IQR)
is the distance between the rst and third quartiles (i.e., box size). Whiskers
extend an additional 1.5× IQR on either sides of the box. We indicate outliers,
or data points outside of the range of the whiskers, with pluses.
bability does not change signicantly over time. This means
that, once we identify a DRAM cell that exhibits high en-
tropy, we can rely on the cell to maintain its high entropy
over time. We hypothesize that this is because a DRAM cell
fails with high entropy when process manufacturing varia-
tion in peripheral and DRAM cell circuit elements combine
such that, when we read the cell using a reduced tRCD value,
we induce a metastable state resulting from the cell voltage
falling between the reliable sensing margins (i.e., falling close
to Vdd2 ) [27]. Since manufacturing variation is fully deter-
mined at manufacturing time, a DRAM cell’s activation failure
probability is stable over time given the same experimental
conditions. In Section 6.1, we discuss our methodology for
selecting DRAM cells for extracting stable entropy, such that
we can preemptively avoid longer-term aging eects that we
do not study in this paper.
6. D-RaNGe: A DRAM-based TRNG
Based on our rigorous analysis of DRAM activation fail-
ures (presented in Section 5), we propose D-RaNGe, a exible
mechanism that provides high-throughput DRAM-based true
random number generation (TRNG) by sourcing entropy from
a subset of DRAM cells and is built fully within the mem-
ory controller. D-RaNGe is based on the key observation
that DRAM cells fail probabilistically when accessed with
reduced DRAM timing parameters, and this probabilistic fail-
ure mechanism can be used as a source of true random num-
bers. While there are many other timing parameters that we
could reduce to induce failures in DRAM [26,27,71,84,85,87],
we focus specically on reducing tRCD below manufacturer-
recommended values to study the resulting activation fail-
ures.4
Activation failures occur as a result of reading the value
from a DRAM cell too soon after sense amplication. This
results in reading the value at the sense ampliers before
the bitline voltage is amplied to an I/O-readable voltage
level. The probability of reading incorrect data from the
DRAM cell therefore depends largely on the bitline’s voltage
at the time of reading the sense ampliers. Because there
is signicant process variation across the DRAM cells and
I/O circuitry [27, 71, 84, 87], we observe a wide variety of
failure probabilities for dierent DRAM cells (as discussed in
Section 5) for a given tRCD value, ranging from 0% probability
to 100% probability.
We discover that a subset of cells fail at ∼50% pro-
bability, and a subset of these cells fail randomly with
high entropy (shown in Section 7.2). In this section, we
rst discuss our method of identifying such cells, which we
refer to as RNG cells (in Section 6.1). Second, we describe the
mechanism with which D-RaNGe samples RNG cells to ex-
tract random data (Section 6.2). Finally, we discuss a potential
design for integrating D-RaNGe in a full system (Section 6.3).
6.1. RNG Cell Identication
Prior to generating random data, we must rst identify cells
that are capable of producing truly random output (i.e., RNG
cells). Our process of identifying RNG cells involves reading
every cell in the DRAM array 1000 times with a reduced
tRCD and approximating each cell’s Shannon entropy [131]
by counting the occurrences of 3-bit symbols across its 1000-
bit stream. We identify cells that generate an approximately
equal number of every possible 3-bit symbol (±10% of the
number of expected symbols) as RNG cells.
4We believe that reducing other timing parameters could be used to
generate true random values, but we leave their exploration to future work.
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We nd that RNG cells provide unbiased output, meaning
that a post-processing step (described in Section 2.2) is not
necessary to provide suciently high entropy for random
number generation. We also nd that RNG cells maintain
high entropy across system reboots. In order to account for
our observation that entropy from an RNG cell changes de-
pending on the DRAM temperature (Section 5.3), we identify
reliable RNG cells at each temperature and store their loca-
tions in the memory controller. Depending on the DRAM
temperature at the time an application requests random val-
ues, D-RaNGe samples the appropriate RNG cells. To ensure
that DRAM aging does not negatively impact the reliabil-
ity of RNG cells, we require re-identifying the set of RNG
cells at regular intervals. From our observation that entropy
does not change signicantly over a tested 15 day period of
sampling RNG cells (Section 5.4), we expect the interval of
re-identifying RNG cells to be at least 15 days long. Our RNG
cell identication process is eective at identifying cells that
are reliable entropy sources for random number generation,
and we quantify their randomness using the NIST test suite
for randomness [122] in Section 7.1.
6.2. Sampling RNG Cells for Random Data
Given the availability of these RNG cells, we use our ob-
servations in Section 5 to design a high-throughput TRNG
that quickly and repeatedly samples RNG cells with reduced
DRAM timing parameters. Algorithm 2 demonstrates the key
components of D-RaNGe that enable us to generate random
numbers with high throughput. D-RaNGe takes in num_bits
Algorithm 2: D-RaNGe: A DRAM-based TRNG
1 D-RaNGe(num_bits): // num_bits: number of random bits requested
2 DP : a known data pattern that results in high entropy
3 select 2 DRAM words with RNG cells in distinct rows in each bank
4 write DP to chosen DRAM words and their neighboring cells
5 get exclusive access to rows of chosen DRAM words and nearby cells
6 set low tRCD for DRAM ranks containing chosen DRAM words
7 for each bank:
8 read data in DW1 // induce activation failure
9 write the read value of DW1’s RNG cells to bitstream
10 write original data value back into DW1
11 memory barrier // ensure completion of write to DW1
12 read data in DW2 // induce activation failure
13 write the read value of DW2’s RNG cells to bitstream
14 write original data value back into DW2
15 memory barrier // ensure completion of write to DW2
16 if bitstreamsize ≥ num_bits:
17 break
18 set default tRCD for DRAM ranks of the chosen DRAM words
19 release exclusive access to rows of chosen words and nearby cells
as an argument, which is dened as the number of random
bits desired (Line 1). D-RaNGe then prepares to generate
random numbers in Lines 2-6 by rst selecting DRAM words
(i.e., the granularity at which a DRAM module is accessed)
containing known RNG cells for generating random data
(Line 3). To maximize the throughput of random number
generation, D-RaNGe chooses DRAM words with the highest
density of RNG cells in each bank (to exploit DRAM par-
allelism). Since each DRAM access can induce activation
failures only in the accessed DRAM word, the density of RNG
cells per DRAM word determines the number of random bits
D-RaNGe can generate per access. For each available DRAM
bank, D-RaNGe selects two DRAM words (in distinct DRAM
rows) containing RNG cells. The purpose of selecting two
DRAM words in dierent rows is to repeatedly cause bank
conicts, or issue requests to closed DRAM rows so that ev-
ery read request will immediately follow an activation. This
is done by alternating accesses to the chosen DRAM words
in dierent DRAM rows. After selecting DRAM words for
generating random values, D-RaNGe writes a known data
pattern that results in high entropy to each chosen DRAM
word and its neighboring cells (Line 4) and gains exclusive
access to rows containing the two chosen DRAM words as
well as their neighboring cells (Line 5).5 This ensures that the
data pattern surrounding the RNG cell and the original value
of the RNG cell stay constant prior to each access such that
the failure probability of each RNG cell remains reliable (as
observed to be necessary in Section 5.2). To begin generating
random data (i.e., sampling RNG cells), D-RaNGe reduces the
value of tRCD (Line 6). From every available bank (Line 7),
D-RaNGe generates random values in parallel (Lines 8-15).
Lines 8 and 12 indicate the commands to alternate accesses to
two DRAM words in distinct rows of a bank to both 1) induce
activation failures and 2) precharge the recently-accessed
row. After inducing activation failures in a DRAM word, D-
RaNGe extracts the value of the RNG cells within the DRAM
word (Lines 9 and 13) to use as random data and restores
the DRAM word to its original data value (Lines 10 and 14)
to maintain the original data pattern. Line 15 ensures that
writing the original data value is complete before attempting
to sample the DRAM words again. Lines 16 and 17 simply
end the loop if enough random bits of data have been har-
vested. Line 18 sets the tRCD timing parameter back to its
default value, so other applications can access DRAM without
corrupting data. Line 19 releases exclusive access to the rows
containing the chosen DRAM words and their neighboring
rows.
We nd that this methodology maximizes the opportunity
for activation failures in DRAM, thereby maximizing the rate
of generating random data from RNG cells.
6.3. Full System Integration
In this work, we focus on developing a exible substrate
for sampling RNG cells fully from within the memory con-
troller. D-RaNGe generates random numbers using a simple
rmware routine running entirely within the memory con-
troller. The rmware executes the sampling algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2) whenever an application requests random samples
and there is available DRAM bandwidth (i.e., DRAM is not
servicing other requests or maintenance commands). In order
to minimize latency between requests for samples and their
corresponding responses, a small queue of already-harvested
random data may be maintained in the memory controller
for use by the system. Overall performance overhead can be
minimized by tuning both 1) the queue size and 2) how the
memory controller prioritizes requests for random numbers
relative to normal memory requests.
In order to integrate D-RaNGe with the rest of the system,
the system designer needs to decide how to best expose an
interface by which an application can leverage D-RaNGe to
generate true random numbers on their system. There are
many ways to achieve this, including, but not limited to:
• Providing a simple REQUEST and RECEIVE interface for
applications to request and receive the random num-
bers using memory-mapped conguration status registers
(CSRs) [156] or other existing I/O datapaths (e.g., x86 IN
and OUT opcodes, Local Advanced Programmable Interrupt
Controller (LAPIC conguration [61]).
5Ensuring exclusive access to DRAM rows can be done by remapping
rows to 1) redundant DRAM rows or 2) buers in the memory controller so
that these rows are hidden from the system software and only accessible by
the memory controller for generating random numbers.
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• Adding a new ISA instruction (e.g., Intel RDRAND [49]) that
retrieves random numbers from the memory controller and
stores them into processor registers.
The operating system may then expose one or more of these
interfaces to user applications through standard kernel-user
interfaces (e.g., system calls, le I/O, operating system APIs).
The system designer has complete freedom to choose between
these (and other) mechanisms that expose an interface for
user applications to interact with D-RaNGe. We expect that
the best option will be system specic, depending both on
the desired D-RaNGe use cases and the ease with which the
design can be implemented.
7. D-RaNGe Evaluation
We evaluate three key aspects of D-RaNGe. First, we show
that the random data obtained from RNG cells identied by
D-RaNGe passes all of the tests in the NIST test suite for
randomness (Section 7.1). Second, we analyze the existence
of RNG cells across 59 LPDDR4 and 4 DDR3 DRAM chips
(due to long testing time) randomly sampled from the overall
population of DRAM chips across all three major DRAM
manufacturers (Section 7.2). Third, we evaluate D-RaNGe in
terms of the six key properties of an ideal TRNG as explained
in Section 3 (Section 7.3).
7.1. NIST Tests
First, we identify RNG cells using our RNG cell identica-
tion process (Section 6.1). Second, we sample each identied
RNG cell one million times to generate large amounts of
random data (i.e., 1 Mb bitstreams). Third, we evaluate the en-
tropy of the bitstreams from the identied RNG cells with the
NIST test suite for randomness [122]. Table 1 shows the aver-
age results of 236 1 Mb bitstreams6 across the 15 tests of the
full NIST test suite for randomness. P-values are calculated
NIST Test Name P-value Status
monobit 0.675 PASS
frequency_within_block 0.096 PASS
runs 0.501 PASS
longest_run_ones_in_a_block 0.256 PASS
binary_matrix_rank 0.914 PASS
dft 0.424 PASS
non_overlapping_template_matching >0.999 PASS
overlapping_template_matching 0.624 PASS
maurers_universal 0.999 PASS
linear_complexity 0.663 PASS
serial 0.405 PASS
approximate_entropy 0.735 PASS
cumulative_sums 0.588 PASS
random_excursion 0.200 PASS
random_excursion_variant 0.066 PASS
Table 1: D-RaNGe results with NIST randomness test suite.
for each test,7 where the null hypothesis for each test is that a
perfect random number generator would not have produced
random data with better characteristics for the given test than
the tested sequence [99]. Since the resulting P-values for each
test in the suite are greater than our chosen level of signi-
cance, α = 0.0001, we accept our null hypothesis for each test.
We note that all 236 bitstreams pass all 15 tests with similar
P-values. Given our α = 0.0001, our proportion of passing
sequences (1.0) falls within the range of acceptable propor-
6We test data obtained from 4 RNG cells from each of 59 DRAM chips,
to maintain a reasonable NIST testing time and thus show that RNG cells
across all tested DRAM chips reliably generate random values.
7A p-value close to 1 indicates that we must accept the null hypothesis,
while a p-value close to 0 and below a small threshold, e.g., α = 0.0001 (rec-
ommended by the NIST Statistical Test Suite documentation [122]), indicates
that we must reject the null hypothesis.
tions of sequences that pass each test ([0.998,1] calculated
by the NIST statistical test suite using (1 – α) ± 3
√
α(1–α)
k ,
where k is the number of tested sequences). This strongly
indicates that D-RaNGe can generate unpredictable, truly
random values. Using the proportion of 1s and 0s generated
from each RNG cell, we calculate Shannon entropy [131] and
nd the minimum entropy across all RNG cells to be 0.9507.
7.2. RNG Cell Distribution
The throughput at which D-RaNGe generates random num-
bers is a function of the 1) density of RNG cells per DRAM
word and 2) bandwidth with which we can access DRAM
words when using our methodology for inducing activation
failures. Since each DRAM access can induce activation fail-
ures only in the accessed DRAM word, the density of RNG
cells per DRAM word indicates the number of random bits
D-RaNGe can sample per access. We rst study the density
of RNG cells per word across DRAM chips. Figure 7 plots the
distribution of the number of words containing x RNG cells
(indicated by the value on the x-axis) per bank across 472
banks from 59 DRAM devices from all manufacturers. The
distribution is presented as a box-and-whiskers plot where
the y-axis has a logarithmic scale with a 0 point. The three
plots respectively show the distributions for DRAM devices
from the three manufacturers (indicated at the bottom left
corner of each plot).
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Figure 7: Density of RNG cells in DRAM words per bank.
We make three key observations. First, RNG cells are
widely available in every bank across many chips. This
means that we can use the available DRAM access paral-
lelism that multiple banks oer and sample RNG cells from
each DRAM bank in parallel to improve random number gen-
eration throughput. Second, every bank that we analyze has
multiple DRAM words containing at least one RNG cell. The
DRAM bank with the smallest occurrence of RNG cells has
100 DRAM words containing only 1 RNG cell (manufacturer
B). Discounting this point, the distribution of the number of
DRAM words containing only 1 RNG cell is tight with a high
number of RNG cells (e.g., tens of thousands) in each bank,
regardless of the manufacturer. Given our random sample of
DRAM chips, we expect that the existence of RNG cells in
DRAM banks will hold true for all DRAM chips. Third, we
observe that a single DRAM word can contain as many as
4 RNG cells. Because the throughput of accesses to DRAM
is xed, the number of RNG cells in the accessed words es-
sentially acts as a multiplier for the throughput of random
numbers generated (e.g., accessing DRAM words containing
4 RNG cells results in 4x the throughput of random numbers
compared to accessing DRAM words containing 1 RNG cell).
7.3. TRNG Key Characteristics Evaluation
We now evaluate D-RaNGe in terms of the six key proper-
ties of an eective TRNG as explained in Section 3.
Low Implementation Cost. To induce activation fail-
ures, we must be able to reduce the DRAM timing parame-
ters below manufacturer-specied values. Because memory
controllers issue memory accesses according to the timing
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parameters specied in a set of internal registers, D-RaNGe
requires simple software support to be able to programmati-
cally modify the memory controller’s registers. Fortunately,
there exist some processors [7, 8, 40, 84] that already enable
software to directly change memory controller register val-
ues, i.e., the DRAM timing parameters. These processors can
easily generate random numbers with D-RaNGe.
All other processors that do not currently support direct
changes to memory controller registers require minimal soft-
ware changes to expose an interface for changing the mem-
ory controller registers [9, 52, 123, 132]. To enable a more
ecient implementation, the memory controller could be
programmed such that it issues DRAM accesses with dis-
tinct timing parameters on a per-access granularity to reduce
the overhead in 1) changing the DRAM timing parameters
and 2) allow concurrent DRAM accesses by other applica-
tions. In the rare case where these registers are unmodiable
by even the hardware, the hardware changes necessary to
enable register modication are minimal and are simple to
implement [52, 84, 132].
We experimentally nd that we can induce activation fail-
ures with tRCD between 6ns and 13ns (reduced from the de-
fault of 18ns). Given this wide range of failure-inducing tRCD
values, most memory controllers should be able to adjust
their timing parameter registers to a value within this range.
Fully Non-deterministic. As we have shown in Sec-
tion 7.1, the bitstreams extracted from the D-RaNGe-
identied RNG cells pass all 15 NIST tests. We have full
reason to believe that we are inducing a metastable state
of the sense ampliers (as hypothesized by [27]) such that
we are eectively sampling random physical phenomena to
extract unpredictable random values.
High Throughput of RandomData. Due to the various
use cases of random number generation discussed in Section 3,
dierent applications have dierent throughput requirements
for random number generation, and applications may tolerate
a reduction in performance so that D-RaNGe can quickly gen-
erate true random numbers. Fortunately, D-RaNGe provides
exibility to tradeo between the system interference it causes,
i.e., the slowdown experienced by concurrently running ap-
plications, and the random number generation throughput it
provides. To demonstrate this exibility, Figure 8 plots the
TRNG throughput of D-RaNGe when using varying num-
bers of banks (x banks on the x-axis) across the three DRAM
manufacturers (indicated at the top left corner of each plot).
For each number of banks used, we plot the distribution of
TRNG throughput that we observe real DRAM devices to pro-
vide. The available density of RNG cells in a DRAM device
(provided in Figure 7) dictates the TRNG throughput that the
DRAM device can provide. We plot each distribution as a box-
and-whiskers plot. For each number of banks used, we select
x banks with the greatest sum of RNG cells across each banks’
two DRAM words with the highest density of RNG cells (that
are not in the same DRAM row). We select two DRAM words
per bank because we must alternate accesses between two
DRAM rows (as shown in Lines 8 and 12 of Algorithm 2). The
sum of the RNG cells available across the two selected DRAM
words for each bank is considered each bank’s TRNG data
rate, and we use this value to obtain D-RaNGe’s throughput.
We use Ramulator [2, 76] to obtain the rate at which we can
execute the core loop of Algorithm 2 with varying numbers of
banks. We obtain the random number generation throughput
for x banks with the following equation:
TRNG_Throughputx_Banks =
x∑
n=1
TRNG_data_rateBank_n
Alg2_Runtimex_banks
(1)
where TRNG_data_rateBank_n is the TRNG data rate for the
selected bank, and Alg2_Runtimex_banks is the runtime of the
core loop of Algorithm 2 when using x Banks. We note that
because we observe small variation in the density of RNG
cells per word (between 0 and 4), we see that TRNG through-
put across dierent chips is generally very similar. For this
reason, we see that the box and whiskers are condensed into
a single point for distributions of manufacturers B and C.
We nd that when fully using all 8 banks in a single DRAM
channel, every device can produce at least 40 Mb/s of random
data regardless of manufacturer. The highest throughput we
observe from devices of manufacturers A/B/C respectively
are 179.4/134.5/179.4 Mb/s. On average, across all manufac-
turers, we nd that D-RaNGe can provide a throughput of
108.9 Mb/s.
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Figure 8: Distribution of TRNG throughput across chips.
We draw two key conclusions. First, due to the parallelism
of multiple banks, the throughput of random number genera-
tion increases linearly as we use more banks. Second, there is
variation of TRNG throughput across dierent DRAM devices,
but the medians across manufacturers are very similar.
We note that any throughput sample point on this g-
ure can be multiplied by the number of available channels
in a memory hierarchy for a better TRNG throughput esti-
mate for a system with multiple DRAM channels. For an
example memory hierarchy comprised of 4 DRAM channels,
D-RaNGe results in a maximum (average) throughput of 717.4
Mb/s (435.7 Mb/s).
Low Latency. Since D-RaNGe’s sampling mechanism con-
sists of a single DRAM access, the latency of generating ran-
dom values is directly related to the DRAM access latency.
Using the timing parameters specied in the JEDEC LPDDR4
specication [63], we calculate D-RaNGe’s latency to gener-
ate a 64-bit random value. To calculate the maximum latency
for D-RaNGe, we assume that 1) each DRAM access provides
only 1 bit of random data (i.e., each DRAM word contains
only 1 RNG cell) and 2) we can use only a single bank within
a single channel to generate random data. We nd that D-
RaNGe can generate 64 bits of random data with a maximum
latency of 960ns. If D-RaNGe takes full advantage of DRAM’s
channel- and bank-level parallelism in a system with 4 DRAM
channels and 8 banks per channel, D-RaNGe can generate 64
bits of random data by issuing 16 DRAM accesses per channel
in parallel. This results in a latency of 220ns. To calculate the
empirical minimum latency for D-RaNGe, we fully parallelize
D-RaNGe across banks in all 4 channels while also assuming
that each DRAM access provides 4 bits of random data, since
we nd a maximum density of 4 RNG cells per DRAM word
in the LPDDR4 DRAM devices that we characterize (Figure 7).
We nd the empirical minimum latency to be only 100ns in
our tested devices.
Low System Interference. The exibility of using a dif-
ferent number of banks across the available channels in a
system’s memory hierarchy allows D-RaNGe to cause vary-
ing levels of system interference at the expense of TRNG
throughput. This enables application developers to gener-
ate random values with D-RaNGe at varying tradeo points
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depending on the running applications’ memory access re-
quirements. We analyze D-RaNGe’s system interference with
respect to DRAM storage overhead and DRAM latency.
In terms of storage overhead, D-RaNGe simply requires
exclusive access rights to six DRAM rows per bank, consisting
of the two rows containing the RNG cells and each row’s
two physically-adjacent DRAM rows containing the chosen
data pattern.8 This results in an insignicant 0.018% DRAM
storage overhead cost.
To evaluate D-RaNGe’s eect on the DRAM access latency
of regular memory requests, we present one implementa-
tion of D-RaNGe. For a single DRAM channel, which is the
granularity at which DRAM timing parameters are applied,
D-RaNGe can alternate between using a reduced tRCD and
the default tRCD . When using a reduced tRCD , D-RaNGe gen-
erates random numbers across every bank in the channel.
On the other hand, when using the default tRCD , memory
requests from running applications are serviced to ensure
application progress. The length of these time intervals (with
default/reduced tRCD) can both be adjusted according to the
applications’ random number generation requirements. Over-
all, D-RaNGe provides signicant exibility in trading o its
system overhead with its TRNG throughput. However, it is
up to the system designer to use and exploit the exibility for
their requirements. To show the potential throughput of D-
RaNGe without impacting concurrently-running applications,
we run simulations with the SPEC CPU2006 [3] workloads,
and calculate the idle DRAM bandwidth available that we
can use to issue D-RaNGe commands. We nd that, across all
workloads, we can obtain an average (maximum, minimum)
random-value throughput of 83.1 (98.3, 49.1) Mb/s with no
signicant impact on overall system performance.
Low Energy Consumption. To evaluate the energy con-
sumption of D-RaNGe, we use DRAMPower [1] to analyze
the output traces of Ramulator [2, 76] when DRAM is (1) gen-
erating random numbers (Algorithm 2), and (2) idling and not
servicing memory requests. We subtract quantity (2) from
(1) to obtain the estimated energy consumption of D-RaNGe.
We then divide the value by the total number of random bits
found during execution and nd that, on average, D-RaNGe
nds random bits at the cost of 4.4 nJ/bit.
8. Comparison with Prior DRAM TRNGs
To our knowledge, this paper provides the highest-
throughput TRNG for commodity DRAM devices by exploiting
activation failures as a sampling mechanism for observing
entropy in DRAM cells. There are a number of proposals to
construct TRNGs using commodity DRAM devices, which
we summarize in Table 2 based on their entropy sources. In
this section, we compare each of these works with D-RaNGe.
We show how D-RaNGe fullls the six key properties of an
ideal TRNG (Section 3) better than any prior DRAM-based
TRNG proposal. We group our comparisons by the entropy
source of each prior DRAM-based TRNG proposal.
8.1. DRAM Command Scheduling
Prior work [116] proposes using non-determinism in
DRAM command scheduling for true random number gener-
ation. In particular, since pending access commands contend
with regular refresh operations, the latency of a DRAM access
is hard to predict and is useful for random number generation.
Unfortunately, this method fails to satisfy two important
properties of an ideal TRNG. First, it harvests random num-
bers from the instruction and DRAM command scheduling de-
cisions made by the processor and memory controller, which
8As in prior work [14,73,106], we argue that manufacturers can disclose
which rows are physically adjacent to each other.
does not constitute a fully non-deterministic entropy source.
Since the quality of the harvested random numbers depends
directly on the quality of the processor and memory controller
implementations, the entropy source is visible to and poten-
tially modiable by an adversary (e.g., by simultaneously
running a memory-intensive workload on another processor
core [104]). Therefore, this method does not meet our design
goals as it does not securely generate random numbers.
Second, although this technique has a higher throughput
than those based on DRAM data retention (Table 2), D-RaNGe
still outperforms this method in terms of throughput by 211x
(maximum) and 128x (average) because a single byte of ran-
dom data requires a signicant amount of time to generate.
Even if we scale the throughput results provided by [116] to
a modern day system (e.g., 5GHz processor, 4 DRAM chan-
nels9), the theoretical maximum throughput of Pyo et al.’s
approach10 is only 3.40Mb/s as compared with the maximum
(average) throughput of 717.4Mb/s (435.7Mb/s) for D-RaNGe.
To calculate the latency of generating random values, we
assume the same system conguration with [116]’s claimed
number of cycles 45000 to generate random bits. To provide
64 bits of random data, [116] takes 18µs, which is signi-
cantly higher than D-RaNGe’s minimum/maximum latency
of 100ns/960ns. Energy consumption for [116] depends heav-
ily on the entire system that it is running on, so we do not
compare against this metric.
8.2. DRAM Data Retention
Prior works [65, 141] propose using DRAM data retention
failures to generate random numbers. Unfortunately, this
approach is inherently too slow for high-throughput operation
due to the long wait times required to induce data retention
failures in DRAM. While the failure rate can be increased by
increasing the operating temperature, a wait time on the order
of seconds is required to induce enough failures [66,72,91,112,
117] to achieve high-throughput random number generation,
which is orders of magnitude slower than D-RaNGe.
Sutar et al. [141] report that they are able to generate 256-
bit random numbers using a hashing algorithm (e.g., SHA-256)
on a 4 MiB DRAM block that contains data retention errors
resulting from having disabled DRAM refresh for 40 seconds.
Optimistically assuming a large DRAM capacity of 32 GiB
and ignoring the time required to read out and hash the
erroneous data, a waiting time of 40 seconds to induce data
retention errors allows for an estimated maximum random
number throughput of 0.05 Mb/s. This throughput is already
far smaller than D-RaNGe’s measured maximum throughput
of 717.4Mb/s, and it would decrease linearly with DRAM
capacity. Even if we were able to induce a large number of
data retention errors by waiting only 1 second, the maximum
random number generation throughput would be 2 Mb/s, i.e.,
orders of magnitude smaller than that of D-RaNGe.
Because [141] requires a wait time of 40 seconds before
producing any random values, its latency for random number
generation is extremely high (40s). In contrast, D-RaNGe
9The authors do not provide their DRAM conguration, so we optimisti-
cally assume that they evaluate their proposal using one DRAM channel.
We also assume that by utilizing 4 DRAM channels, the authors can harvest
four times the entropy, which gives the benet of the doubt to [116].
10We base our estimations on [116]’s claim that they can harvest one
byte of random data every 45000 cycles. However, using these numbers
along with the authors’ stated processor conguration (i.e., 2.8GHz) leads to
a discrepancy between our calculated maximum throughput (≈ 0.5Mb/s) and
that reported in [116] (≈ 5Mb/s). We believe our estimation methodology
and calculations are sound. In our work, we compare D-RaNGe’s peak
throughput against that of [116] using a more modern system conguration
(i.e., 5GHz processor, 4 DRAM channels) than used in the original work,
which gives the benet of the doubt to [116].
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Proposal Year EntropySource
True
Random
Streaming
Capable
64-bit TRNG
Latency
Energy
Consumption
Peak
Throughput
Pyo+ [116] 2009 Command Schedule 7 3 18µs N/A 3.40Mb/s
Keller+ [65] 2014 Data Retention 3 3 40s 6.8mJ/bit 0.05Mb/s
Tehranipoor+ [144] 2016 Startup Values 3 7 > 60ns (optimistic) > 245.9pJ/bit (optimistic) N/A
Sutar+ [141] 2018 Data Retention 3 3 40s 6.8mJ/bit 0.05Mb/s
D-RaNGe 2018 Activation Failures 3 3 100ns < x < 960ns 4.4nJ/bit 717.4Mb/s
Table 2: Comparison to previous DRAM-based TRNG proposals.
can produce random values very quickly since it generates
random values potentially with each DRAM access (10s of
nanoseconds). D-RaNGe therefore has a latency many orders
of magnitude lower than Sutar et al.’s mechanism [141].
We estimate the energy consumption of retention-time
based TRNG mechanisms with Ramulator [2, 76] and DRAM-
Power [1, 25]. We model rst writing data to a 4MiB DRAM
region (to constrain the energy consumption estimate to the
region of interest), waiting for 40 seconds, and then reading
from that region. We then divide the energy consumption
of these operations by the number of bits found (256 bits).
We nd that the energy consumption is around 6.8mJ per
bit, which is orders of magnitude more costly than that of
D-RaNGe, which provides random numbers at 4.4nJ per bit.
8.3. DRAM Startup Values
Prior work [39, 144] proposes using DRAM startup values
as random numbers. Unfortunately, this method is unsuitable
for continuous high-throughput operation since it requires a
DRAM power cycle in order to obtain random data. We are
unable to accurately model the latency of this mechanism
since it relies on the startup time of DRAM (i.e., bus frequency
calibration, temperature calibration, timing register initial-
ization [60]). This heavily depends on the implementation
of the system and the DRAM device in use. Ignoring these
components, we estimate the throughput of generating ran-
dom numbers using startup values by taking into account
only the latency of a single DRAM read (after all initialization
is complete), which is 60ns. We model energy consumption
ignoring the initialization phase as well, by modeling the
energy to read a MiB of DRAM and dividing that quantity
by [144]’s claimed number of random bits found in that re-
gion (420Kbit). Based on this calculation, we estimate energy
consumption as 245.9pJ per bit. While the energy consump-
tion of [144] is smaller than the energy cost of D-RaNGe, we
note that our energy estimation for [144] does not account
for the energy consumption required for initializing DRAM
to be able to read out the random values. Additionally, [144]
requires a full system reboot which is often impractical for
applications and for eectively providing a steady stream of
random values. [39] suers from the same issues since it uses
the same mechanism as [144] to generate random numbers
and is strictly worse since [39] results in 31.8x less entropy.
8.4. Combining DRAM-based TRNGs
We note that D-RaNGe’s method for sampling random
values from DRAM is entirely distinct from prior DRAM-
based TRNGs that we have discussed in this section. This
makes it possible to combine D-RaNGe with prior work to
produce random values at an even higher throughput.
9. Other Related Works
In this work, we focus on the design of a DRAM-based
hardware mechanism to implement a TRNG, which makes
the focus of our work orthogonal to those that design PRNGs.
In contrast to prior DRAM-based TRNGs discussed in Sec-
tion 8, we propose using activation failures as an entropy
source. Prior works characterize activation failures in order
to exploit the resulting error patterns for overall DRAM la-
tency reduction [27, 71, 84, 87] and to implement physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) [72]. However, none of these
works measure the randomness inherent in activation failures
or propose using them to generate random numbers.
Many TRNG designs have been proposed that exploit
sources of entropy that are not based on DRAM. Unfortu-
nately, these proposals either 1) require custom hardware
modications that preclude their application to commodity
devices, or 2) do not sustain continuous (i.e., constant-rate)
high-throughput operation. We briey discuss dierent en-
tropy sources with examples.
Flash Memory Read Noise. Prior proposals use random
telegraph noise in ash memory devices as an entropy source
(up to 1 Mbit/s) [119, 153]. Unfortunately, ash memory is
orders of magnitude slower than DRAM, making ash un-
suitable for high-throughput and low-latency operation.
SRAM-based Designs. SRAM-based TRNG designs ex-
ploit randomness in startup values [55, 56, 151]. Unfortu-
nately, these proposals are unsuitable for continuous, high-
throughput operation since they require a power cycle.
GPU- and FPGA-Based Designs. Several works harvest
random numbers from GPU-based (up to 447.83 Mbit/s) [24,
143, 149] and FPGA-based (up to 12.5 Mbit/s) [33, 54, 96, 155]
entropy sources. These proposals do not require modica-
tions to commodity GPUs or FPGAs. Yet, GPUs and FPGAs
are not as prevalent as DRAM in commodity devices today.
Custom Hardware. Various works propose TRNGs
based in part or fully on non-determinism provided by cus-
tom hardware designs (with TRNG throughput up to 2.4
Gbit/s) [6,16,22,23,56,57,77,101,111,114,134,146,158]. Unfor-
tunately, the need for custom hardware limits the widespread
use of such proposals in commodity hardware devices (today).
10. Conclusion
We propose D-RaNGe, a mechanism for extracting true
random numbers with high throughput from unmodied
commodity DRAM devices on any system that allows ma-
nipulation of DRAM timing parameters in the memory con-
troller. D-RaNGe harvests fully non-deterministic random
numbers from DRAM row activation failures, which are bit
errors induced by intentionally accessing DRAM with lower
latency than required for correct row activation. Our TRNG
is based on two key observations: 1) activation failures can be
induced quickly and 2) repeatedly accessing certain DRAM
cells with reduced activation latency results in reading true
random data. We validate the quality of our TRNG with the
commonly-used NIST statistical test suite for randomness.
Our evaluations show that D-RaNGe signicantly outper-
forms the previous highest-throughput DRAM-based TRNG
by up to 211x (128x on average). We conclude that DRAM row
activation failures can be eectively exploited to eciently
generate true random numbers with high throughput on a
wide range of devices that use commodity DRAM chips.
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